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ChapterX

The Great Repression:
Criminal Punishment in the Nineteen-Eighties
Michael Mandel*

Introduction
Even before the stock market plummeted in October of 1987,
parallels were being drawn between our era and the years just before
the Great Crash of 1929. According to the experts, in each era an
extraordinarily narrow concentration of wealth was aided and
abetted by governments that were strikingly similar in their nondoctrinaire support for big business, combining handsome subsidies
on the one hand with a laissez-faire approach to regulation and taxes
on the other. Each era was seized by a takeover/merger mania
financed by spiralling debt and fragile credit devices such as "margin
buying" (in the 1920s) and "junk bonds" (in the 1980s). The stock
market was widely believed, in each era, to be completely out of
touch with the strength of the economy, and based instead on pure
speculation (Davis 1987; Thomas 1987; Galbraith 1987), the whole
thing resembling a mass game of chicken. Both periods saw
quantum leaps in Canada's integration into the American economic
orbit: the twenties was the decade in which U.S. capital bought out
Canadian manufacturing and extraction industries, and the eighties
was the decade of the Free Trade Agreement. Each decade started
with a severe recession and the second half of each saw a boom
which created unheard-of wealth, but also unheard-of inequality;
spectacular profits were made amid falling wages and farm incomes.
Even the moral crusade of the late eighties, the "War on Drugs,"
seemed like a replay of Prohibition, complete with its hypocrisy,
*The. author wishes to thank William Evans and Elain Bright for their help
compiling tables and graphs, Caroll Barrett and Maggie Stockton for their
stenographic work, and Harry Glasbeek, as always, for his friendly advice. For
reasons of space, several sections of this paper had to be omitted, which may
account for (some of) the disjointedness.
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international adventurism, official and unofficial violence, and,
naturally, the fortunes being made from it (Thompson 1985:63-69,
77-96, 138-157, 193-195; Granatstein et al. 1986:197-203).
Conventional wisdom holds that a crash of 1929 dimensions would
be very different this time around, what with social "safety nets" and
the "general cushioning effect" of Keynesian fiscal policies
(Galbraith 1987:64). But there is reason to believe that the results of
the next crash will be much worse than they were after 1929
because, on at least one very important index, the appropriate
comparison for our times is not with the period just before the Great
Depression but with its very depths. This is the index of repression.
("'In criminal punishment terms, the Great Depression was more
)'\ repressive than any period before, and as repressive as any period
l since, except our era.
'~ As far as criminal punishment is concerned, the 1980s was the
most repressive decade in Canada's history. During that decade, the
per capita prison population reached and sustained an all-time postconfederation high. This occurred at a time when the official
philosophy of corrections emphasized "community" above all else.
The emphasis on community was due to the fact that in relative
terms--but only in relative terms--imprisonment is a declining form
of punishment. Since the 1960s, imprisonment has been greatly
outstripped by the growth of penal measures that operate outside of
the traditional prison setting. The most prominent of these is the
probation order, a device of infinite variety: from the occasional
meeting with a probation officer, through unpaid work ("community
service"), to conditions identical to imprisonment ("probation
hostels"). On any given day, there are now three times as many
people serving sentences of probation as there are in prison. Of
course, this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that our
imprisonment rate is higher than it has ever been. And this is in
addition to a probation population never before seen in Canada's
history.
1

Canada's Most Repressive Decade
The prison population
In determining the relative repressiveness of various periods in
Canadian history, we are at the disadvantage of lacking consistent,
comprehensive data. Comparable adult imprisonment figures
covering all of Canada are only available since 1955. However, the
method of reporting has changed significantly in two major respects.
In the first place, since 1979 a distinction has been made between
those "on register" and those "actually in" a given prison. This
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reflects the growth in the 1970s and 1980s of lawful absences from
prison, especially "day parole." Since these mechanisms are part of
~e new "cornn:unity" form of punishment, it would be misleading to
mclude them m a comparison of prison populations in the past
especially since there were no comparable forms of lawful absence~
during the periods of high prison populations prior to the current
one (eg. 1961-1965 and 1931-1935). Consequently, I have tried to
stick to the "actual in" counts, though sometimes these have had to be
~stimated. The second major change affecting comparability of data
is the Young Offenders Act (YOA), which came into force in April
1985. The effect of this was to transfer a large number of offenders
fron: adult court an~ ad1:1lt punishment to youth court and youth
pumshment because 1t raised the age of majority for criminal law
pu~oses fr~m between 16 and 18, depending on the province, to a
umform national age of 18. This, and this alone, is responsible for
the apparent fall-off in the adult prison population after 1985.
However, to adopt the new definitions for comparison purposes
would also be misleading, because 16- and 17-year olds are still
being imprisoned; in fact they are being imprisoned in greater
numbers than they were before YOA. The only real difference is
that they are being imprisoned under different legislative mandates.
To merely accept the reclassification as determinative would make
long-term historical comparisons impossible. I have tried, therefore
to adjust the figures to counteract this "Young Offenders Act effect.
Ontario keeps separate figures for 16- and 17-year olds sentenced
under the YOA and I have used these to project a national effect
C?ased on Ontario's share of the relevant measures). I have then
simply added these projected national figures to the conventionally
reported adult imprisonment figures.I It turns out that, even apart
from the YOA, the 1980s were the most prison-prone decade in
Canada's history, but not to take account of the YOA effect would be
to unnecessarily minimize the trends of the decade. Furthermore,
excluding .these numb~rs gives the completely misleading impression
that the pnson population started to fall drastically in the late 1980s.
Appendix Table I shows that in each of the years 1983 through to
1988 the per capita prison population exceeded the previous record
high (for the period covered by the table) of 1963 by between 2.7
per cent and 9 .5 per cent. The average prison population per
100,000 Canadian population for the five year period 1984-1988
e~ceeded the five-year period 1961-1965 (the previous five year
high) by 111.3 to 103.6 (a difference of 7.4 per cent). The decade
average for 1980-1988 exceeded the 1960s average by 105.6 to
99. 7 .2 The average prison rate for the 1970s was only 89.3 per
11

'
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100,000, with a high of 96.4 in 1977. Since 1955, therefore, the
current period is clearly the most repressive in terms of the
proportion of the Canadian population in prison on any given day.
To reach back farther, we have to use proxy figures. The "total
institutional population" (Appendix Table. II) has the advantage of
ooino back to 1916; but it has the considerable disadvantage of not
dis~guishing between adult and juvenile detention. This tab.le shows
that the hioh imprisonment period of 1961-1965 was also higher, on
average ci23.2 per 100,000), than any other period since 1916,
including 1930-1934 (117.3), though the rate for its highest year in
total institutional terms (1964:125.9) was slightly lower than the rate
for 1932 (126.1), the depths of the Depression. To estimate the adult
rate for the Depression so that it can be compared with the 1980s
requires deflating the Depression figures to remove the element of
juvenile imprisonment.
This results in an average adult
imprisonment rate for 1934 of between 98.6 an~ 105.3 per lOO;DO?
(depending on the assumptions one makes),3 puttmg the Depressions
worst years well below the levels reached in the 1980s. The n:ost
repressive year of the Depression era, 1932 (0.2 percentage pom!s
above the most repressive year of the early 1960s), would, on this
calculation, be assigned an adult imprisonment rate of between 105.7
and 113.24 per 100,000 Canadian population, still below the 1987
level of 114. If the entire decade of the 1930s is considered, the
relative severity of our era becomes even more obvious. The
average total (including juvenile) imprisonment rate for the 1960s
was 118.7 per 100,000; it was 99.7 for adult institutions. For the
· 1930s as a whole, the average total institutional population was 113.1
per 100,000, from which can be estimated an adult population of
between 95 and 101.5 adult prisoners per 100,000 population,
compared to the 1980s adult institution average of 105.6.5
The only figures we have going back all the way to 1867 are for
the penitentiary population (Appendix Table III; Figure 1). In
Canada, "penitentiary" has a specialized meaning: p~isons
administered by the federal government. Consequently, these figures
leave out of account those prisoners serving sentences in provincially
administered institutions, a varying percentage of the prison
population which has always constituted more than half of the total
prisoners. The penitentiary population has varied as a p~rcentage of
the total prison population from a low of 26.7 per cent m 1937 t~ a
high of 43.5 per cent in 1974. On the other hand, :vhile
"penitentiary," is a purely jurisdictional term and does not designate
any particular type of prison, Canadian criminal law has always
reserved "penitentiaries" (i.e., federally-administered prisons) for

prisoners serving sentences of two years or more, i.e., the longest
sentences. So the penitentiary population can serve as an index of
penal severity: at any given time, what proportion of the Canadian
population are serving prison sentences of two years or more? Here,
too, the current era takes the prize. The average penitentiary
population for 1984-1988 was 42.9 per 100,000, while for 19311935 it was only 38.2.

Penitentiary Population Per 100,000 Total Population
Decade
Decade
Decade
High
Average
44.2 (1986)
40
1980-88
41.3 (1973)
38
1970-79
39.7 (1964)
37
1960-69
36.0 (1959)
34
1950-59
33.l (1940)
1940-49
29
43.1 (1933)
35
1930-39
29.6 (1922)
26
1920-29
24
26.6 (1910)
1910-19
26.9 (1900)
24
1900-09
27.9 (1898)
26
1890-99
26
28.5 (1880)
1880-89
22
28.7 (1879)
1870-79
28.1 (1867)
25
1867-69
[From Appendix Table III]

So, in terms of imprisonment, the 1980s were the most repressive
years in Canada's history, including the years of the Great
Depression.6 Of course, imprisonment is not the only form of state
repression and certain other forms were more typical of the Great
Depression than of our own era. One such form was the death
penalty (Appendix Table IV). There were 83 executions for murder
in the years 1931-1935, almost twice as many as during the five-year
period either preceding or following, and over one-third more than
any other period in Canada's history (the next blood thirstiest period
was 1946-1950, with 62 executions). The Depression was more
violent in terms of the death penalty than any era before or since.
There have been no judicial executions in Canada since 1962. In
purely quantitative terms, these numbers are very insignificant:
adding them to the prison population does not change the rounded
per 100,000 population rate at all. But state-sanctioned killing
cannot just be ignored. On the other hand, our era has no right to be
complacent about its lack of capital punishment. Deaths "by legal
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intervention" (that is, killings by police or prison guards), judicially
sanctioned, were far from unknown in the 1980s. In the years 19801986 (the latest for which figures are available), such deaths
numbered 63, or 9 per year (Statistics Canada 1980-86).
Furthermore, deaths of prisoners averaged 77 a year for the last ten
years for which information is available (1979-1?88); of thes~, ;'3
per year were suicides--about 6.5 times the Canadian rate (Stat1st1cs
Canada 1987-1988: Table 31; 1980-86). There are no readily
available figures with which to compare our era and the 1930s in this
respect}
. ..
In quantitative terms, far more s1gmf1cant th~n deaths were ~e
great number of deportations that took place durmg the Depress10n
(Appendix Table V). The deportations for the years 1930_-1933
were almost triple the per capita rate for any four years m the
nineteen-eighties. Adding deportations to imprisonment ~hanges the
picture considerably, making the 1980s at most only slightly more
repressive than the 1930s (122.7 to 121.3), and perhaps even less
repressive (122.7 to 127 .8), depend.ing on. the. formula used.
Whatever the formula, adding deportat10ns to 1mpnsonment means
that the period 1930-1934 was substantially w_orse than 1984-1~88
(146.4/153.l to 124.7); it also means that th~ high rat~ of repress10n
for 1932 far outweighed the rate for the fiscal penod 1982-1983
(178.7/186 to 130.4).
It is important to determine whether the number of persons
deported should be added to the number of persons impris_oned.
Should deportation be regarded as on the same level of repress10n as
imprisonment? There is no question that a large i:u~ber of
Depression deportations were meant to supplement the cmmnal law
system. In the first place, there are many d?~umente_d cases of the
use of deportation to rid the country of political radicals, some of
whom had been convicted of crimes and had already served terms of
imprisonment (Roberts 1988:48-52). Secondly, deportation was used
"as an alternative to relief," an explicit means of "'shovelling out' the
unemployed" (Ibid 1988:162,169). On the other hand, there are a
number of documented cases of people who wanted to be deported,
especially to the British Isles (:Vhe:e ~ost of the dep_ortees wound
up) because of the desperate situation m Canada (Ibid _1988:185).
Tbinos could be substantially better at home and deportat10n meant a
free if uncomfortable, passage. While the government's claim of 90
per' cent voluntary deportees was certainly exagge~ated (Ibid
1988:181-82), it is hard to know where the truth hes. More
importantly, there is a great difference b~tween i~prisonn:e~t and
deportation to one's home country (assummg one is not clalffilng to
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be a refugee). For one thing, the state's concern with the deportee
ends at the border; the deportee, as such, is under no sentence of any
sort in the home country. For another thing, the element of
enforced isolation is lacking; in the 1930s, whole families were
deported along with the breadwinner (Ibid 1988).
Of course, the point is not to minimize deportation, or even the
desperate conditions of working people neither deported nor
imprisoned. What we are trying to grasp, and what distinguishes
certain periods in our history, especially our own, is the level of
state repression, the repression of the public sphere as opposed to
the private sphere. In this regard, deportation seems much more like
probation than imprisonment. Imprisonment localizes punishment
and surveillance in an isolated institution. Probation and related
measures, such as parole, extend punishment and surveillance beyond
the walls of the prison into the community, where, at various levels
of restraint, the offender is kept under surveillance and required to
carry out certain duties, more or less onerous depending on the
circumstances of the case. Some probation can certainly be more
repressive than deportation. Deportation, where involuntary,
follows the offender to the border and then says goodbye; probation
and related measures follow the offender into the community and
keep an eye on him or her for years.
Whether or not the correct analogy for deportation is probation, it
is clear that probation must be taken into account in any
quantification of repression. If that is so, then the Depression,
deportations and all, is no match for the current era in terms of
repression.
The probation population
In comparison to the prison population, the probation population has
grown not only steadily but spectacularly. This is almost entirely a
post-World War II development. There was some probation before
the War, but it was on a tiny scale. Ontario appointed the first two
adult probation officers in 1922, but progress was slow and there
were only eight of them altogether in Ontario between 1930 and
World War II (McFarlane 1966:31-32). These were the only adult
probation officers in the entire country (Canada 1956:13-14;
Sheridan and Konrad 1976:254). Only 14 officers in all had been
appointed in Ontario by 1951 (McFarlane 1966:62). Then, suddenly,
between 1952 and 1956, the complement grew from 15 to 94 (Ibid
1966:67). By 1965 there were 167 (Ibid 1966:96-97). Subsequent
developments in admissions can be seen from Appendix Table VI.
While jail admissions outnumbered probation admissions by 9:1 in

184 I Criminal Justice

1965, this ratio had dropped to under 7:1 by 1972, to under 3:1 by
1976, down to just over 2:1 in 1979, where it has hovered since. At
the same time, the rate of probation admissions grew from about 98
per 100,000 population in 1965 to 367 pe~ in its peak year of 1982.
Another indication of the rate of growth 1s that between 1951 and
1979 Ontario's adult probation officer complement went from 15 to
429 (including supervisors) (Hatt 1985:300).
Other provinces shared this experience. Alberta was the second
province with adult probation services in 1940 and British Columbia
followed in 1946 (Sheridan and Konrad 1976:254). The number of
probation officers in British Columbia just about doubled every five
years from 1950 through 1975, from 6 officers to 266, an increase
in rate from about .5 per 100,000 British Columbia population to 11
per 100,000 (Ibid 1976:254-255). The adult probation system in
British Columbia employed 350 officers in 1979-1980 (13.5 per
100,000 population) (Hatt 1985:300). National probation figures do
not exist for earlier than 1978-1979, and since that time they have
remained fairly stable, with probation accounting for roughly one in
every four admissions to the correctional system (Appendix Table
VIII) (Ontario's roughly one in three is high on the national scale.)
But admission rates are nothing compared to average daily
population rates (Figure 2). Somewhere between 1965 and 1972,
the number of adults on probation in Ontario, which had been
insignificant, indeed verging on non-existent prior to 19?0,
surpassed the number of adults in prison. By 1975 the figure, which
had more than doubled in relation to Ontario's total population, was
also more than twice as high as the prison population. By 1979 it
was more than three times as high, and by 1983 Ontario's adult
probation population was more than four times its adult prison
population (Appendix Table VII).8 Once again _the national
dimensions are similar, if slightly more modest, with the adult
probation population at approximately three times the prison
population (Appendix Tables IX).
We can now return to our comparison with the Great Depression.
During the 1980s (1980-1988), the average daily a.dult population
under judicially ordered control and supervision, including prison,
probation, parole and mandatory supervision, was 429.8 per 100,000
(422.4 for 1979-1988), with a high of 462 in 1987. If deportations
are added to this, the total "repression rate" can be calculated at
446.8 per 100,000 for 1980-1988 with a high of 471.6 in 1986-1987.
This is 3.5 times our best estimate for the 1930s, a rate of between
121.3 and 127.8. The particularly repressive years of 1984-1988
had an average rate of 465.8 per 100,000, more than 3 times the
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most repressive Depression years of 1930-1934, with an estimated
rate of between 146.4 and 153.1. The peak year of 1987, with a rate
of 471.6, was more than 2.5 times the Depression high rate of
between 178.7 and 186 in 1932.
It is true that there was some minor Depression probation activity
which probably should be added to the figures we have already
calculated, if only for the sake of completeness. They do not change
the picture at all, however. There were only 8 probation officers
operating in Ontario during the Depression compared to 429 in
1979. Ontario accounted for all of the Depression probation for
adults, but only about 52 per cent of probation in the 1980s
(Statistics Canada 1987-1988:125). There was also a form of parole
in the pre-War period, but it was entirely lacking in enforceable
conditions, or the parole officers to enforce them. This means that
probation/parole levels during the Depression could be no more than
about 1 per cent of what they are now, even assuming constant
caseloads, which seems very unlikely, as caseloads appear to have
more than doubled between 1965 and 1979 alone.9 But even
assuming constant caseloads, this would mean a maximum of about
900 cases in total during the Depression, or about 9 per 100,000;
adding this to the figures for the 1930s does not change things at all.
The 1980s remain more than 3 times as repressive as the 1930s, the
late 1980s 2.9 times as repressive as the early 1930s (the worst years
of the Depression), and 1987 2.4 times as repressive as 1932, which,
until the 1980s had been Canada's worst year for repression.IO In
other words, the 1980s were easily the most repressive years in
Canada's history.11
.

Understanding Decarceration
Official ideologists have described the community corrections
movement in the most glowing terms imaginable:
Diversion is a promise!
It is a promise that the poor, the uneducated, the disadvantaged
and the abandoned who come in conflict with the law will
receive the support and compassion of their communities
(Canada 1978:10).
Even among left-wing criminologists it is possible to find the risina
rate of repression and the proliferation of community correction~
treated as "contradictory" or as "a momentous liberal compromise"
(Taylor 1985:331). It is obvious that community corrections is
neither promise nor compromise. The level of imprisonment has not
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only not abated, but has actually increased with comm~nity
corrections, which have added to the arsenal of the state techmques
of repression that are sometimes as intrusive as the traditional forms-indeed indistinguishable from them in some cases--and often more
insidious. One thinks, for example, of the electronic bracelet to keep
the probationer or parolee under constant Orwellian surveillance; or
of the "probation hostel," minimum security prisons where persons
under sentence of probation mix with persons under sentence of
imprisonment (R.v Degan 1985). The community corrections
phenomenon has expanded the power of the state's repressive
apparatus, and has been predictably employed to increase
enormously the proportion of the population under criminal s~ntence
and surveillance, with no observable impact on the level of cmne. It
is hard to imagine a more important object of criminal law reform
than the reversal of this trend. In Foucault's words:
If there is an overall political issue around the prison, it is not
therefore whether it is corrective or not; whether the judges, the
psychiatrists or the sociologists are to exercise more power in it
than the administrators or the supervisors; it is not even whether
we should have prison or something other than prison. At
present, the problem lies rather in the steep rise in the use of
these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers
which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring
with them (1977:306).
In order to stop something, though, you usually have to know why
it is happening in the first place. Do we know what is causing all of
this repression? Do we know anything about what causes variations
in the repression rate?
What strikes even the casual student of the history of punishment
in the twentieth century is how closely changes in the repressive rate
seem to parallel changes in economic conditions or what is often
called the "business cycle." The Great Depression of the 1930s, and
the recessions of the late 1950s and the early 1980s have all been
accompanied by a steep rise in the rate of repression. The recovery
periods of the late 1930s and the mid 1960s were both periods of
falling repression. During the sustained period of rising repression
that Canada has experienced since the Second World War, there has
been an "upward drift" of unemployment rates; in other words "the
unemployment floor has been at a successively higher level" (Ostry
and Zaidi 1979:146).
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Greenberg (1977) has shown a striking correlation between --"
oscillations in the annual unemployment rate for ages 16 and over (
and annual admissions to Canadian penitentiaries during the years 1
1945-1959, a correlation of 92 per cent with only a slight time lag of
imprisonment behind unemployment. U.S. data are reported to be
remarkably similar. In fact, the relationship between unemployment
and repression is fairly well-established in the criminological
literature (Crow et al. 1989). What is not so well-established is the
mechanism at work. Most conventional explanations of the
connection between repression and unemployment are via an
assumed relationship between crime and unemployment. The
conventional explanation is that economic recession causes crime,
and this rather predictably brings forth more repression. For
example, Ehrlich argues that high unemployment and an otherwise
contracting economy create greater material incentives for property
crime and diminish disincentives such as the loss of earning capacity
one might experience from a sentence of imprisonment (1973:52930, 538-39, 555). Tepperman has provided a more subtle analysis of
the Great Depression in Canada along similar lines: severe
conditions resulted in crimes of protest, crimes 6f "day-to-day
survival" and crimes of just plain "craziness" (1977:176-79).
The problem with the conventional explanation is the persistently
weak relationship shown between the crime rate and the
unemployment rate. In Greenberg's (1977) study, the rate of
penitentiary admissions had nothing to do with the cdminal
conviction rate and little to do with the crime rate itself. The
relation between the homicide rate and the unemployment rate,
though substantial (.22), was too weak to support the changes in
penitentiary admissions. Greenberg concluded that:

J

It thus appears that in both Canada and the United States,
changes in commitments to prison can be explained almost
entirely by changes in the unemployment rate. Changes in the
number of cases entering the criminal justice system and
potentially available for imprisonment seem to be unimportant,
as does the crime rate (1977:650).
Like American rates, Canadian rates of reported crime since 1960
bear no apparent relation to the oscillations of the prison population
over the same period. Crime rates have risen more or less steadily,
while repression rates have fluctuated with the business cycle. The
same was true during the Great Depression: conviction rates had
been rising steadily from the beginning of the century and merely
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continued to rise through the Depression, albeit at an accelerated rate
in some categories (Tepperman 1977:181, 216).
Such observations have lead to more complicated hypotheses.
Some studies have emphasized the sentencing system. For example,
one study found that when controls for average prison sentences
were imposed, the amount of variation in U.S. federal prison
population explained by the unemployment rate dropped from 70 per
cent to 54 per cent. Thus, a little more than one-fifth of the
connection between prison population and unemployment was
explained by sentencing, with nothing explained by the conviction
rate (Yeager 1979). Greenberg, too, concluded that the answer lay
in the sentencing system. Though he doubted that judges consciously
"orient their sentencing policies to the requirements of the labour
market and that they agree on how this can best be done" (1977:650),
he was willing to "speculate" along two lines: either that "judges are
less willing to grant probation to offenders when they are
unemployed, or that unemployment affects levels of community
tolerance toward offenders, to which judges respond in sentencing"
(Ibid 1977:650).
Both hypotheses have their adherents. A recent study of English
courts emphasized the way "unemployment restricts options" in
sentencing (Crow et al. 1989:27). Controlling for offence and
record, the authors found that an offender's employment status made
a significant contribution to the severity of the sentence: an
unemployed offender was less likely to be fined and was more likely
to get probation, a community service order, or prison. The effect
varied from community to community. It was most pronounced in
traditionally low unemployment areas, in punitive courts, and in
areas where unemployment was increasing from low to high (Ibid
1989:47). Even where unemployment was high, it made a difference
in a negative way: judges felt it important to keep an employed
person out of jail so as not to jeopardize employment status (Ibid
1989:61-62).
rIn Canada, employment status is both an empirically observable
1
\ and legally accepted factor in determining a sentence, despite the lack
~of any plausible philosophical justification (Mandel 1984). On the
/ other hand, employment status is not considered by judges as an end
/ in itself, but rather as a part of the assessment of the offender's
\"_'.'character." "Fault,:' even in matters of u_ne_mploym~nt, is. an
· important part of this. It seems far too legahstlc--especially smce
sentencing is the most "unlegal" aspect of criminal law--to let the
courts off the hook by assuming that they would inadvertently ignore
the general economic climate in assessing the offender's character.
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The hardening of official, including judicial, attitudes seems a
more likely explanation of increased repression. Tepperman makes
a strong case for an increase in "official punitiveness," as well as in
real crime during the Depression, with sentencing severity and
conviction rates rising to unheard-of heights in the early thirties and
then falling back again (1977:62-65). The most striking evidence is
the execution rate. As Appendix Table IV shows, the years 1931_.-,,
1935 had the most executions for any five year period before or/
since, but they had fewer homicides and murder charges than the
prior five year period. What they had was an 89 per cent higher \
conviction-to-charge rate for murder charges, and a 50 per cent/
higher likelihood of a death sentence being carried out. In other ,
words, despite the lower homicide rate, a person charged with j
murder was almost twice as likely to be executed during 1931-1935 I
than during 1926-1930.
•
The Depression was a period not only of severe deprivation but of
extremely high working class militancy. The Communist Party
achieved its greatest popularity and influence, the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation was founded, and the real fear of
revolution lead to severely repressive actions on the part of the
government. This included the outlawing of the Communist Party,
the imprisonment of its leaders, and violent confrontations between
workers and police, such as during the "On-to-Ottawa Trek"
(Thompson and Seager 1985:222-35):

f'

With mounting discontent with the way Canada was being run
during the Depression, the government, police and courts may
have organized more tightly to punish and control the discontent
throughout the country (Tepperman 1977:176).
Tepperman's general hypothesis is that "the worse socioeconomic
conditions become, the more punitive judges and juries become"
(1977:63). Stephen Box has advanced a version of this to explain a
similar rise of repression in the 1980s in the United Kingdom, where
prison sentence admissions rose from 117 per 100,000 population in
1956 to 187 in 1983, and the average prison population went from
64 to 87 per 100,000 during the same period (1987:12). Box
demonstrates that increases in the official crime rate, while reflecting
real increases in crime (as shown by victimization studies) greatly
exaggerate them.12 One United Kingdom study showed that about 85
per cent of the increase in burglary between 1972 and 1983 was
attributable to increased reporting (Ibid 1987:18-21). Box argues
that some of this is due to increased willingness to report crime on
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behalf of victims and better record keeping by police, but that it also
reflects greater official punitiveness and fear of rebellion:
As unemployment rises, so the surplus labour force becomes a
body viewed more suspiciously by the governing elite, not
because it actually does become disruptive and rebellious, but
because it might (1987:62).
1 \~Nevertheless, even those advancing a "punitiveness" hypothesis
j have attributed at least some of the increase in repression to real

J increases in crime.

Recent studies have suggested that it may be
stronger than we have thought and that the problem with the studies
so far is that they have not been sufficiently sensitive to different
types of crime. When crime rates are "disaggregated" into different
types, a much closer relationship between repression and crime can
be observed. A sophisticated cross-national study has found that
prison rates correlate with serious crimes (homicide, robbery,
aggravated assault, fraud) but not with minor ones (theft, burglary)
(Moitra 1987:71, 86). This difference is something we should expect
from the changing roles of prison and probation mentioned above.
Furthermore, disaggregated unemployment data has shown a closer
relationship between unemployment and crime: certain age groups
are more vulnerable than others to being affected by unemployment,
and their situation is better grasped by certain measures of
unemployment (eg. participation rates) rather than others (Crow et
al. 1989:6-10). Once again, there is clearly an exaggeration effect:
for example, unemployed people are searched more often by police
(Ibid 1989:10-11).
There is much skepticism among eminent criminologists about the
reality of the increase in crime. Chan and Ericson have shown that
most of the post-war increase in minor crime can be accounted for
by increases in per capita policing alone (Chan and Ericson 1981:5153). Furthermore, the steady rise in official U.S. crime rates has not
been matched by victimization surveys which show the crime rate
stable through the 1970s and actually falling through the 1980s
(Hagan 1986:59; Siegel 1989:62-63; Chambliss 1988:32-35). On the
other hand, victimization surveys exclude the homicide rate, which
has also increased substantially. This increase is extremely unlikely
to be artificial because of the difficulty in manufacturing homicides
that have not really occurred and the high likelihood that those that
occur will come to official attention. There is very little doubt, even
among statistic skeptics, about the reality of the homicide increase
(Chambliss 1988:40-41; Hagan 1986:175). Indeed, the homicide rate
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d~rin~ the l~te 1920s and the e~rly years of the Depression, though a
histoncal high water mark until the mid 1960s, was far below the
averages Canada has experienced for the last two decades. Homicide
averaged 1.1 per 100,000 between 1936 and 1966, while for the
1930s, the average was 1.4 per 100,000. The worst five years for
homicide in the Depression era (1928 to 1932) averaged 1.7 per
100,000; since the 1970s, the homicide rate has averaged 2.6 per
100,000 population, and the murder rate (only the most serious
homicides), ~.4. The worst year for homicide during the Depression
was 1930, with a rate of 2.1 per 100,000; since 1972, the murder
rate in Canada has never fallen below 2.1, and the homicide rate,
never below 2.3 (Reed 1983:221-27). Indeed, it has been argued
that homicide rates underestimate the increase in the rate of lethal
violence:

Faster ambulances, better communications, transportation, and
~~ergency room service meant better treatment for seriously
lllJured persons, so that many who previously would have been
homicide statistics were surviving (Hagan 1986:177).
It is worth noting that the attempted murder rate increased more
than four times as rapidly as the murder rate between 1962 and 1987
(Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1962a, 1965, 1968; Statistics Canada
1971b, 1975a, 1980, 1983a, 1984, 1985a, 1986e, 1987b).
If murder has genuinely increased, there is good reason to believe
that violence in general has as well, even if some part of the official
increase is a reporting phenomenon. On the other hand, it is also
clear that violent offenders make up a small part of the clientele of
the total population under sentence, and can in no way account for
either the increase in prison populations or, for the explosion in
probation. Thus it is clear from the sheer numbers that many of
those in comm1:1nity corrections would never have gone to prison.
Furthermore, with what we know about the increasing punitiveness
and intrusiveness of community corrections, it is also clear that those
who would not have gone to prison would not have been subject to
anything like the supervisory regime they now experience. This also
lends support, indirectly, to the notion that much of the conduct now
attracting probation would not even have reached the level of official
notice before. It is hard to see the incentive for the police bothering
to take notice of things about which nothing or virtually nothing is
going to be done.
None of the alternatives--increased crime, increased repression, or
both--is very appetizing, of course. Either we are more repressed
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because we are more victimized or we are merely more victimized
by being more repressed. But on the best evidence, we seem to be
left with this: downturns in the business cycle cause real crime to
rise, and this is met by increased repression, but in a way that
exaggerates, sometimes to a great extent, the real increase in crime.
How is it though, that we are now more punitive than during the
Depression? If unemployment is responsible, then the Depression
should have been far more repressive than our own era. The
Depression was a "total and massive disruption of the economy" with
unemployment rates reaching more than 19 per cent, almost twice
the worst post-Depression rate of 11.8 per cent in 1983.
It is possible to dispute the comparability of unemployment
figures. Modem statistics clearly underestimate unemployment by
excluding "discouraged workers," those who have given up actively
looking for work because there are no jobs (Chen and Regan
1985:20-21). Also, unemployment rates do not take into account the
growing substitution of part-time for full-time jobs. Between 1975
and 1985 part-time workers as a percentage of all workers increased
from 10.6 per cent to 15.2 per cent (Rinehart 1987:165-66; van
Cleef 1985). On the other hand, it is clear that there was nothing in
the 1980s to match the severity or abruptness of the economic
downturn of the early 1930s, when unemployment, however
measured, increased threefold between 1929 and 1930 and sixfold
between 1929 and 1933, and when average per capita income was cut
in half between 1928 and 1933 (Thompson and Seager 1985:350-51).
Furthermore:
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this thesis was Foucault. Foucault argued that the disciplinary
technique, which first flourished in factories, schools, hospitals, and
prisons, from very early on exhibited a "swarming" tendency, a
"tendency to become 'deinstitutionalized,' to emerge from the closed
fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a 'free'
state" (1977:211). At the beginning of the penitentiary system in the
late eighteenth century one already sees the use of disciplinary
mechanisms, not in the form of enclosed institutions, but "as centres
of observation disseminated throughout society." Foucault gave the
example of the Paris charity associations that sent out their
missionaries on regular family visits for the purpose of reforming
proletarian life (1977:212):
On the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of a
disciplinary society in this movement that stretches from the
enclosed disciplines, a sort of social 'quarantine,' to an
indefinitely generalizable mechanism of 'panopticism'
(1977:216).

The unemployed of that period were mainly adult males--the
sole family earner--and there was no "safety net" of
unemployment insurance or other income-support measures
which today greatly reduce the disastrous economic effects of
unemployment on the working population (Ostry and Zaidi
1979:145).

For Foucault the prison held a special place in the disciplinary
design. It was the mechanism which fashioned the "delinquent" (the
dangerous individual--whose dangerousness does not reside solely in
the offence--needing supervision) from the "offender" (the mere
violator of laws needing no supervision). Delinquency, "with the
generalized policing that it authorizes, constitutes a means of
perpetual surveillance of the population: an apparatus that makes it
possible to supervise, through the delinquents themselves, the whole
social field." Foucault argued that this surveillance was at first "able
to function only in conjunction with the prison" because of the
powers of surveillance it authorized over the prisoner and exprisoner population (1977:281). But soon there began to develop a
"carceral archipelago," a series of institutions "beyond the frontiers
of criminal law" (Ibid 1977:298). The frontiers of criminal law:

In other words, the reasons for the greater repressiveness of our
era must be sought outside of the short-term economic fluctuations,
which have been the object of most studies of crime and
unemployment. The reasons must have something to do with longterm differences between our era and the Depression.
Several theorists have postulated a kind of self-perpetuating
expansion of the repressive capacity of the state, which is supposed to
have an inbuilt tendency to spread from the enclosed institutions and
to penetrate society ever more deeply. The foremost proponent of

tended to disappear and to constitute a great carceral continuum
that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent
disciplines, transmitting disciplinary norms into the very heart
of the penal system and placing over the slightest illegality, the
smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly, the threat of
delinquency. A subtle, graduated carceral net, with compact
institutions, but also separate and diffuse methods, assumed
responsibility for the arbitrary, widespread, badly integrated
confinement of the classical age (1977:297).

194 I Criminal Justice

The formation of this "archipelago" had for Foucault some
important implications. One of these was the tendency to dissolve
the distinction between crime and abnormality. Instead:
A certain significant generality moved between the least
irregularity and the greatest crime; it was no longer the offence,
the attack on the common interest, it was the departure from the
norm, the anomaly; it was this that haunted the school, the
court, the asylum or the prison ... You will end up in the
convict-ship, the slightest indiscipline seems to say; and the
harshest of prisons says to the prisoners condemned to life: I
shall note the slightest irregularity in your conduct (Ibid
1977:299).
Extending the carceral system beyond legal imprisonment succeeded
"in making the power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering at
least the threshold of tolerance to penalty" (Ibid 1977:301). It did
this by giving legal legitimacy to all of the disciplines through their
connection with the law (Ibid 1977:302) and by freeing legal
punishment from the appearance of excess and violence:
Between the latest institution of 'rehabilitation', where one is
taken to avoid prison, and the prison where one is sent after a
definable offence, the difference is (and must be) scarcely
perceptible. There is a strict economy that has the effect of
rendering as discreet as possible the singular power to punish,
the carceral 'naturalizes' the legal power to punish, as it
'legalizes' the technical power to discipline. By operating at
every level of the social body and by mingling ceaselessly the
art' of rectifying and the right to punish, the universality of the
carceral lowers the level from which it becomes natural and
acceptable to be punished. (Ibid 1977:302-03).
The spread of disciplinary power involved its fragmentation and
dispersal to ubiquitous practitioners:
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the
society of the teacher-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social
worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the
normative is based ...The carceral network. . .has been the
greatest support, in modem society, of the normalizing power
(Ibid 1977:304).
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Foucault's v1s10n of the localized penitentiary mechanism
inexorably dissolving into the invisibly carceral city is obviously a
profoundly disturbing one. An ever larger section of the population
comes under the sway of an increasingly superior means of
exercising power, superior because it is more subtle, more finely
tuned, less visible and, therefore, more acceptable. The central locus
of Bentham's "Panopticon" turns out to have limited its ability to
"see without being seen." Most disturbing of all is the implication
that the growth of this power is inevitable and completely detached
from the history of political struggle that (even on Foucault's
account) gives rise to it. It represents an inevitable technological
impulse which, once set in motion, we are powerless to stop.
Though Foucault did counsel opposition, nothing in his work
provides any theoretical foundation for it actually to occur. Indeed,
in his view, if discipline had not already eliminated politics
altogether, it eventually would.
There are a number of reasons, however, to doubt this bleak view.
If there are really no political forces driving these mechanisms, how
is it that the decarceration boom had to await the aftermath of the
cataclysmic events of the mid-twentieth century? Why does
repression rise and fall with the business cycle? How is it that these
community measures are compatible with a great expansion in the
traditional overt, "compact" repression of the penitentiary? Why has
the growth of the carceral city not seen the decline of the
penitentiary? Has Foucault unduly neglected the purely repressive
features of imprisonment, of the penitentiary as an institution for
punishment, in his concern with the disciplinary "addition"?
Repression implies resistance, or at least a lack of discipline. How
can an increasingly "disciplinary society" also be an increasingly
chaotic one where resort must increasingly be had to undisguised
repression?
A useful contribution to a resolution of these contradictions has
been made by Santos who argues that there is a "structural
combination" between the community therapy of decarceration and
the retributive renaissance in punishment (1980:386). Both, he
argues, are ways of replicating the social status quo while appealing
to symbols of autonomy. Santos relies on the notion of "chaosmic
power" to describe the repressive aspects of decarceration and other
forms of informal or community justice. By leaving people to their
own devices, these reforms replicate and therefore reinforce social
power. They "integrate the sanctioning power in the ongoing social
relationships connecting cosmic power to the chaosmic power which
up until now had been outside its reach" (Ibid 1980:391). Where
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retribution legitimizes the status quo through the fiction of free will,
community therapy does so by prescribing the status quo (the
"community") as therapy. In other words, it is the "community" not
the "therapy" that is the key to the concept.
In using the community, the state "is expanding through a process
which on the suiface appears to be a process of retraction" (emphasis
in original):
In other words, the state is expanding in the form of civil
society and that is why the dichotomy of state/civil society is
theoretically not useful anymore if ever it was. And because the
state expands in the form of civil society, social control may be
exercised in the form of social participation, violence in the
form of consensus, class domination in the form of community
action. In other words, the state power expands in a kind of
indirect rule. (Ibid 1980:391).

The community corrections movement fits this description very well.
Whereas the prison was meant to be the egalitarian penalty (Foucault
1977:232), probation represents the fruition of the penitentiary
technique's replication of the inegalitarianism of the private sector.
Probation is an infinitely flexible instrument for the distribution of
offenders. It can use the entire community, with its diversity, to
situate the offender in the proper designated role. The desired
power relations can be enforced (or not enforced as in the case of
privileged offenders) in situ, where and when they are supposed to
take place, not, as with prison, after some period of preparation.
One not only teaches the delinquent habits of industry, one actually
puts the delinquent to work.
Apart from the enormous growth in the dimensions of the penal
system which can be credited to the advent of community measures-"net widening," et cetera--this added flexibility itself represents a net
increase in power. Indeed, flexibility is what unites the
; developments in probation with the expansion and elaboration of the
\prison itself. Increases in the use of both probation and
\imprisonment have been accompanied by further changes in the
nature of both imprisonment and probation. Both have become
more fungible, in the sense that each measure contains such great
variety in levels of intrusiveness that imprisonment can be very
much like probation and probation very much like imprisonment.
Flexibility means that the differences within the notions of prison
and community become as important as the differences between
them. The specific designation of the sanction is increasingly
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irrelevant. Even the conviction itself is of decreasing importance as
the conviction melts into the discharge which melts into the diversion
program with no admission of guilt. All of these form a great
continuum along which offences and offenders can be subtly
distributed, according to their prescribed role in structure of social
power relations.
Thus, while in the case of R. v Malboeuf (1982), in which the
defendant was a young Native in need of "stabilization," probation
meant the equivalent of a minimum security prison for his breaking
and entering, for businessman A. (R. v A. 1974), it meant a $1000
payment as "restitution" to the employee he tried to rape; and while
for thousands of Ontario offenders, probation meant menial tasks
such as snow-shovelling, for Keith Richards, caught in Toronto with
22 grams of heroin, it meant two free concerts for the blind at the
earliest convenience of the Rolling Stones (R. v Richards 1979).
Accepting that we have a new, insidious form of power to contend
with, we are still left trying to explain why this should be happening
now. One attempted explanation comes from the frequently heard
official defence of community corrections in terms of economics,
i.e., that they constitute a great money savings over imprisonment.
The embrace of community measures coincided with the "fiscal
crisis" of deficit financing that hit Western governments in the
nineteen-seventies, so many commentators have sought to explain
community corrections this way. Santos himself favours a fiscal
crisis explanation, supplemented by the ideological appeal of notions
of "community" in an era in which real community is disappearing.
Legitimacy in a time of economic contraction is more a matter of
symbols than of "goods and services," thus the appeal to
"transcendental values" (Santos 1980:391) such as "community" and
"responsibility" (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1976a, 1976b;
Canada 1977:Chapter 4). Santos believes that "state sponsored
community organization will be the specific form of disorganization
[of the oppressed classes] in late capitalism" (Santos 1980:390). Like
Foucault, Santos foresees:
a dislocation of power from formal institutions to informal
networks. Social networks will then become the dominant unit
of power production and reproduction, a source of power which
is diffuse and interstitial and which as a consequence is as
familiar as it is remote (1980:392).
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The fiscal crisis explanation has also been adopted by Scull (1977,
1984) who treats "decarceration" as a form of carceral
"privatization."
Privatization has both fiscal and correctional aspects. It is the
ideal-term designation of the 1980s movement by right-wing
provincial and federal governments, following the example of the
United Kingdom, to raise billions of dollars by selling off large
chunks of the public sector, often at bargain-basement prices
(Corcoran 1990); at the same time, the private sector itself has been
turned over to the free play of market forces, through such
deregulation initiatives as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
The movement has many counterparts in the correctional system.
One of these is the delivery of correctional services by private
enterprise.
In the United States privatization of prison services, indeed of
entire prisons in some states, has been a way governments have
attempted to solve the problem of the costs of building new prisons
to cope with overcrowding (Wilson 1989:175ff.; Globe and Mail
July 24, 1986:All, July 25, 1986:A8). In Canada, privatization has
so far been restricted to community corrections, but that has meant
that most of the expansion of such services has come in
nongovernmental form, through agencies of both the "not-forprofit" and, increasingly, the "for-profit" form (Griffiths and
Verdun-Jones 1989:592-93). In Ontario, all community residential
centres and agencies are privately run on contract with the
government, as are two-thirds of the community service order
programs (Ontario 1985:46). In the mid-eighties, the federal
government also began to contract agencies run privately for profit
to provide parole supervision and half-way houses (Globe and Mail
December 9, 1986:A19).
When public services are privatized by right-wing governments
under a free market ideology, they generally operate more in
accordance with market principles, which means a deterioration in
those services delivered primarily to poor people. Even when the
government is the main consumer in privatized service, the quality is
reduced, because the government is seeking to reduce costs (often in
wages to skilled, unionized employees), and because the private
service exists to make profit. But the prison is not just another social
service; besides meeting the needs of its clientele, it must also control
and discipline them. Thus, we should not be surprised to learn that
in the context of prison, privatization can mean something quite
different from what it means in the context of other social services;
in fact, prison privatization means quite the opposite of neglect.
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When a major privatization initiative in parole supervision was
announced in 1986, the government reassured the public by
promising that the reporting requirements for parolees had been
doubled (Globe and Mail September 20, 1986:Al 1). So privatization
in corrections does not entail a loosening of the grip on offenders; on
the contrary, it gives the government "more bang for its buck" and
thus becomes a form of expansion and intensification of penal
discipline.
Privatization takes other forms. The rather sudden concern by the
penal system for "the victim" can be seen in this light. Victims and
their grievances are obviously not new; what is new is the attention
paid to them by the penal system. Practically, this has meant making
restitution an important part of punishment, usually as part of a
probation order. fu Ontario, restitution orders are included in 15 per
cent of all probation orders, amounting to $5 million worth for adult
offenders and another half million dollars for young offenders in
1987 alone (Ontario 1987:12,16). Restitution orders seem to
function both as an alternative to prison for respectable offenders
with the ability to pay (Jackson 1982:23-24), and as a means of
toughening up an otherwise non-incarcerative sentence, in either case
placating actual and potential victims. Both the community service
order and the restitution order appeared with the denunciatory
rationale of punishment (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1974a,
1974b, 1975, 1976a), and were conceived as punitive, not
therapeutic, devices. A greater role in sentencing is also being given
to the victim through "victim-impact" statements (Criminal Code,
section 735 (1.1) in force January 1, 1989) and mediation
alternatives (Baskin 1988). As with community service orders and
other community measures, it appears that the offenders sentenced to
restitution are drawn primarily from offenders who would not have
gone to prison in the first place. The authors of one study of a
popular Ontario restitution/mediation program concluded:
On the whole VORP [Victim/Offender Reconciliation Program]
has contributed little to sparing offenders imprisonment.
Instead of avoiding problems created by the use of the prison
system, another sentencing option has been implemented which
pulls a different set of offenders deeper into the system of social
control and inevitably increases cost (Dittenhoffer and Ericson
1983:346).
The net result of the restitution initiative is to leave the punishment
increasingly to a negotiation between victim and offender. No less
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than in the case of economic privatization, the private sphere is not
an equal one; negotiation is inevitably influenced by the bargaining
strength of the parties. The availability and onerousness of a
restitution order depends on the financial status of the offender (R. v
Hudson 1981; R. v Sugg 1986; R. v Collard 1987; R. v Wilcox
1988). The more the offender can pay, the more likely the offender
will be able to buy off a more intrusive sentence. Furthermore, the
more the offender can pay, the more likely it is that the victim can
be persuaded to ask the court to make a restitution order instead of
ordering a prison sentence (R. v A. 1974; R. v Davies 1988). If the
offender cannot pay, then the offender works, either for the victim,
or more often, under a community service order. The latest
development combines restitution and community service through
fines. Increasingly, offenders without money are given the choice of
working off their fines instead of serving the time in prison (Ontario
1986:13; R. v Hebb 1989; Globe and Mail February 10, 1989:Al l).
These fines in turn are being earmarked for victim-assistance
programs, as in the 1989 "victim-fine surcharge" amendment to the
Criminal Code or the 1985 "fine-option" amendment (Criminal
Code, ss. 718.1; 727.9). Of course, people who can afford their
fines (which are still not set according to ability to pay) just pay
them. This seems rather appropriate for our economic system:
those without property must work while those with property need
not bother.
We have been examining the "fiscal crisis" explanation of
community measures. The problem with purely fiscal explanations of
this phenomenon, however, is that it has not resulted in a diminution
of traditional repressive measures; it is part of the expansion, not the
contraction, of the state's repressive capacity. In other words,
though community measures clearly cost less than prisons, when both
are expanding, the explanation cannot be restricted to governments
trying to save money (Chan and Ericson 1981).
In their important work on the origins of the penitentiary system,
Melossi and Pavarini (1981) have also offered a plausible
interpretation of the developments we have been examining. Their
main point is to show how changing productive relations can account
for the rise of the penitentiary as the specific form of social control
in competitive capitalism; but they also argue that the radical changes
which have since taken place in productive relations in the twentieth
century can similarly account for the nature of modern social
control. They point to the concentration, centralization and changing
organic composition of capital, the rise of unions, state involvement
in the economy and the disintegrating effect this has all had on the
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once firm lines between public and private spheres. In late
capitalism the market place becomes more and more the object of
organization by business, union, and state:
The sphere of circulation and consumption were subjected to the
direct rule of capital: decisions on prices, the organization of
the market and at the same time of a consensus, all became part
of one and the same thing. Not only were the traditional
instruments of social control strengthened--those areas of "the
sphere of production" outside the factory from capitalism's
inception--but also new instruments were created. The new
strategy was towards dispersion, towards the extension and
pervasion of control. Individuals are no longer locked up; they
are got at where they are normally locked up: outside the
factory, in society as a whole. Propaganda, the mass media, a
new and more efficient network of police and social assistance,
these are the bearers of a new kind of social control (Ibid
1981:6).
More control of the marketplace is necessitated by ever more severe
market dislocations, such as that of the Great Depression itself;
inefficiency and unemployment abound and capital can no longer
afford to follow its own logic. Rising unemployment even
diminishes the need to prepare people for the factory; more and
more what they have to be prepared for is idleness in the
community. Community measures become part of this attempt to
organize the community coercively when it can no longer be relied
upon to regulate itself efficiently. This was, in fact, the express
rationale of those who advocated an increased role for probation in
the 1940s in Canada. Blaming rising prison populations on the
breakdown of "proper home training during the past quarter
century," the call went out for better funding, co-ordination and
"legal authority" for the state's efforts to "step in and apply the
necessary remedy where parents are failing in their duties" (Ontario
1943:6):
Parents who have failed are rather likely to fail again unless
they are sufficiently strengthened and helped by probation
officers and others who are capable. Very often that support
and help are non-existent. In much of this province there are no
regular probation officers, and where there are their time and
energies are spread over too many cases (Ontario 1945:6-7).
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Not for one moment was probation to be confused with leniency in
punishment; it was more and not less intervention that was being
called for:
Probation without proper supervision is dangerous. Too
frequently it is worse...Akin to the abuse of probation is the
practice of suspending sentences without a proper followthrough. Generally there is no follow-through. Delinquents
and criminals are well aware of that fact. The chance that they
will be brought back and sentenced for breach of recognizance
or the offence on which sentence is suspended is so small that
they boldly ignore it and pursue their way (Ontario 1945:6-7).
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phenomenon can be seen as the late capitalist breakdown in the
separation between public and private spheres as applied to the
penitentiary system: an attempt to expand state discipline ever more
deeply into the community as capitalism becomes ever less capable of
"standing on its own two feet" and traditional penal measures and
levels of punishment become ever less capable of holding things
together.

NOTES
Thus the ideology underpinning the rapid expansion of the Ontario
probation system in the early 1950s was an explicitly disciplinary
one. The increase in prison population was blamed on a lack of
proper supervision in situ, which could only be solved by state
intervention in the form of probation supervision. Probation was
advocated as a kind of penal Keynesianism, a state intervention into a
malfunctioning private sphere. It is thus no coincidence that the
great post-war increases in the proportion of economic activity
taking place through the state and the increase in public sector
employment coincide with the dramatic increase in community
measures. But, rather than one causing the other, they tum out both
to be products of the same underlying contradiction, the increasing
inability of an economy structured upon private profit to (a)
reproduce itself without violence, and (b) meet our basic economic
needs. Instead of the full development and use of the energy and
talent of the entire population, improved standards of living, and
decreasing inequality, we have precisely the opposite: ever higher
levels of unemployment (Ostry and Zaidi 1979), a stagnating
economy (Statistics Canada 1988:21-22, 28) and increasing inequality
(Ross and Shillington 1989:34; CALURA 1988:28-29, 56; Davis
1987:36; Globe and Mail December 30, 1989:El 1).
This leads to a much different assessment than the one offered by
Foucault (1977), who saw "decarceration" as a purely technological
movement detached from politics and bound to
humanity in a
seamless web of inescapable discipline. Instead of an invincible
movement, decarceration becomes merely a strategy for holding on
to an increasingly unstable social situation, a strategy which seems,
furthermore, to be fraught with its own contradictions, such as
escalating costs and the debasement of the coinage of punishment
through overuse (Matthews 1979). The community measures

1. As adult and juvenile regimes become more alike, the justification for
considering adult repression separately, as the present study does, diminishes;
however, for most of Canada's history adults and children have been subjected to
very different legal punishment regimes.
2. If we leave out the low year of 1969 to make the comparison more
symmetrical, the difference is slightly less: 105.6 to 100.4.
3. If we assume that the relationship between adult imprisonment and juvenile
imprisonment was more or less constant between 1930-34 and 1961-1965, an adult
rate for 1930-1934 can be estimated by applying the known adult/total ratio of
1961-1965 to the figures for 1930-1934. This would give an adult rate of
(103.6/123.2 x 117.3 = 98.6).
But was the relationship constant? There seems no statistical way of knowing
this for sure. The relative use of training school as a disposition for those found
delinquent was similar for the periods 1930-1934 (3464/38815 or 8.9 per cent) and
1961-65 (9771/87096 or 11.2 per cent), but not identical (Reed 1983:Z283-291).
On the other hand, the per capita use of training school as a disposition was 6.6 per
100,000 in 1930-1934, while it was 10.3 in 1961-1965. Per capita use of a
disposition is a far cry from institution population per capita, but these figures still
suggest that a higher proportion of the later than of the earlier total institutional
population involved training schools, which means that the assumption of constant
ratios underestimates the severity of the repression of adults in the 1930s.
To attempt to correct for this, we can apply the 1930-1934/1961-1965
disposition ratio of 6.6/10.3 to the proportion of the population during the 19611965 period that we know constituted juvenile detention: 123.2 - 103.6 19.6, or
15.9 per cent of the total institutional population for 1961-1965. At most training
school seems to have been used 6.6/10.3 less in 1930-1934 than in 1961-1965, so
the juvenile component of the 1930-1934 population can be reckoned at 6.6/10.3 x
10.2 per cent. Therefore, to estimate the 1930-1934 adult
15.9 per cent
population, the period's total population should be deflated by only 10.2 per cent
.898 x 117.3 = 105.3per100,000 population. This is well below the average for
the worst five-year period of the 1980s which was 111.3 per 100,000.
4. On the assumption of a constant ratio between adult and juvenile imprisonment:
126.1/125.9 x 105.5 = 105.7; on the more generous deflater outlined in the prior
footnote: 126.1x.898=113.2.
5. On the assumption of a constant ratio between adult and juvenile imprisonment:
99.7/118.7 x 113/1=95.0; deflated by the formula of endnote 3 (which works out
to .897 in this case): .897 x 113.1 101.5.
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6. Imprisonment figures just released show a rise in the per capita adult prison
population for the fiscal year 1988-1989; it had fallen slightly in 1987-1988. The
rise, not adjusted for the effect of the Young Offenders Act, was 1.9 per cent for all
institutions and 3.2 per cent for penitentiaries (Statistics Canada 1988-89).
7. A study recently reported in the press, but not yet available to me, claims that
prisoner deaths are at an all-time historical high (Globe and Mail May 3, 1990:A8).
8. The reason for the difference between admission and daily population ratios is
the fact that probation terms are generally so much longer than prison terms,
meaning that fewer admissions result in higher average daily populations. The
median prison sentence for provincial admissions (more than 90 per cent of all
admissions) in 1984-1985 was 32 days, whereas the median probation term was 12
months (Statistics Canada 1984-1985:165,173).
9. McFarlane reports 244 probation officers in Ontario in 1965 with an adult
probation population of 5225 (McFarlane 1966:90), while the 429 Ontario
probation officers reported by Hatt for 1979 had to take care of at least 26,362 adult
probationers (Hatt 1985:300; Appendix Table VII).
10. It is possible that the early 1960s surpassed the Depression, or at least equalled
it, but lacking better figures on probation it is difficult to be sure.
11. Probation figures just released show a rise in the per capita adult probation
population for the fiscal year 1988-1989; it had fallen slightly for the two prior
years. The rise, not adjusted for the effect of the Young Offenders Act, was 1.1
per cent. However, a simultaneous fall in the parole population kept the total noncustodial supervised population at a constant per capita level (Statistics Canada
1988-1989).
12. There are parallel Canadian data on crime rates and social class area. It appears
that the higher reported crime rates of lower social class areas are accounted for
partly, but only partly, by higher rates of victimization. Another important
contributing factor is the level of policing which, in effect, exaggerates the higher
level of crime (Hagan, Gillis and Chan 1978).
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I - ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION 1955-1988

1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979a
1979b
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
Sources:

Daily Adult
Institution
Population
Population
On register
(Actual count)

Rate per
100,000
Canadian

31,750(e)
(26,634)
31,378(e)
(26,893)
31,647(e)
(27,392)
31,540(e)
(27,634)
30,992(e)
(26,980)
30,044(e)
(26,924)
27,484(e)
(24,064)
25,678(e)
(22,502)
24,539(e)
(21,936)
25,201(e)
(21,956e)
22,076
22,034
22,337
21,821
20,009
18,484
18,913
18,259
18,165
19,218
19,655
19,712
19,506
19,695
20,141
20,210
19,974
19,222
18,559
17,240
17,461
16,962
15,171
14,503
15,053

123.9 (103.9)
124.0 (106.2)
124.8 (108.0)
125.5 (110.0)
124.5 (108.4)
122.0 (109.3)
112.9 (98.9)
106.8 (93.6)
103.3 (92.4)
107.2 (93.4)
92.9
93.7
96.4
94.9
88.2
82.7
85.8
83.7
84.2
90.2
93.6
95.2
95.7
98.4
102.5
104.8
105.5
103.4
101.8
96.5
99.9
99.3
91.3
90.2
95.9

Actual Count
Adjusted for
YOAEffect*

(28,873e)
(28,864e)
(28,277 e)

(112.7)
(114.0)
( 111.5)

Statistics Canada, 1979, 1982-1983, 1983-1984, 1984-1985, 1985-1986, 1986-1987,
1987-1988; Reed, 1983:Z292-304; Chan and Ericson, 1981:77.

"On register" includes prisoners temporarily out of the institution, whereas "actual
custody" does not. The on-register figures are estimates based on figures for the
federal government and all provinces excluding: B.C. for the whole period, NWT
for the whole period except 1982, Ontario for 1979a-1985 and the Yukon for 1988.
It includes
les (69 per cent of those on register but not in custody in the
federal syst
87-88: Statistics Canada, 1987-1988:91), unlawfully at large
(12 per cent), in hospital (5 per cent), at court (7 per cent), out on bail (2 per cent),
temporary absence (1 per cent) and unspecified (4 per cent). Figures in the table
prior to 1979 are from a different series of publications which purport to be based
on the same principle, viz. "on register" whether or not in actual custody, but notice
the similarity between "actual count" of 1979a (new series) and "on register" of
1979b (old series). On the other hand, the same does not hold for penitentiary
statistics where there is a divergence between the on-register population of the old
series and the actual count of the new (see Table Ill).
e Both sets of figures for 1979a-1988 are average daily or less frequent count for
the fiscal year ending March 31st of the year named. In 1972-1979b the prison
population is as of December 31st of the year named. For 1971 it is December 31st
for federal and Quebec institutions and March 31st for all other provincial
institutions. For 1955-1970 it is March 31st. The Canadian population bases for
the rares are as of June 1st of year named 1955-1979b and as June 1st of the year
before the year named 1979a-1988.
The "YOA effect" is the effect on the prison population of changing (as of April 1,
1985) the age of adulthood so far as the penal system is concerned: 16 and 17 year
olds, who were classified as adults before that date, now became young offenders.
An adjustment has been made to correct for the fact that 16 and 17 year olds are still
being imprisoned, but under a different label. The adjustment is not a projection; it
is based on the number of 16 and 17 year olds actually imprisoned during the years
mentioned. ·The difference is that they are now imprisoned under the authority of
the Young Offenders Act. On the other hand the figures are only estimates based on
data pertaining to the Ontario system only. These figures have undergone
complicated calculations in order to derive a national figure. One perhaps
controversial move is to treat "open custody" as part of the institutional population.
There are good legal and practical grounds for doing this, though the differences are
not great. If open custody had been treated as non-institutional, the figures for
1986-88 would have been: 1988:28,009 (109.3); 1987:28,168 (111.3);
1986:28,277 (110.9).
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III - PENITENTIARY POPULATION 1867-1988

IT - TOTAL INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION 1916-1974
on
of
Institutions
Including
Training Schools

Rate per 0 , 0
Canadian
Population

20,407
1974
0,966
1973
20,136
1972
1971
20,124
22,329
1970
23,448
1969
23,368
1968
23,111
1967
23,455
1966
24,179
1965
1964
24,288
23,512
1963
22,747
1962
21,960
1961
20,628
1960
20,790
1959
20,382
1958
1957
18,301
17,352
1956
1955
18,048
1954
17,369
1953
16,383
1952
15,846
1951
15,295
16,012
1950
1949
14,573
1948
13,454
12,481
1947
1946
11,651
1945
11,334
Sources: Reed, 1983:2198-20

91.2
1944
95.1
1943
92.4
1942
93.3
1941
104.8
1940
111.7
1939
112.9
1938
113.4
1937
117.2
1936
123.1
1935
125.9
1934
124.2
1933
122.4
1932
1931
120.4
115.4
1930
118.9
1929
119.3
1928
110.2
1927
107.9
1926
115.0
1925
113.6
1924
110.4
1923
1922
109.6
109.2
1921
116.8
1920
1919
108.4
104.0
1918
99.4
1917
94.8
1916
93.9
; 2292-304; Al-14.

Daily Population
of All Penal
Institutions
Including
Training Schools

Rate per 1 0,000
Canadian
Population

11,212
10,862
10,451
11,763
12,951
12,874
13,348
12,208
11,154
10,550
11,899
12,657
13,255
12,549
11,223
9,796
8,561
7,964
7,593
7,543
7,126
6,849
7,601
7,191
6,004
5,442
5,026
5,468
5,459

93.9
92.1
89.7
102.2
113.8
114.3
120.5
110.5
101.9
97.3
110.8
119.0
126.1
120.9
109.9
97.7
87.0
82.6
80.3
81.2
77.9
76.0
85.2
81.8
70.2
65.5
61.7
67.8
68.2

Figures are for the last day of the fiscal year: for 1916-1948 this is September
30th, excepting Ontario (March 31st), Nova Scotia (November 30th) and Quebec
(December 31st); for 1949-1970 it is March 31st except for Quebec (December
31st); for 1971 it is March 31st excepting training schools, federal penitentiaries
and Quebec (all December 31st); for 1972-1974 it is December 31st with no
exceptions.

Daily
Penitentiary
Population

Rate per 100,000
Canadian
Population

Daily Population Rate per 100,000
Penitentiary
Canadian
Population
Population

On register
Actual Count
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979a
1979b
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
1950
1949
1948
1947
1946
1945
1944
1943
1942

11,969
12,318
12,281
11,872
11,359
10,638
9,765
9,452
9,305
9,219
9,290
9,309
9,335
9,285
8,700
8,499
9,111
8,253
7,483
7,337
7,117
7,026
7,167
7,438
7,514.
7,651
7,219
7,156
6,738
6,344
6,295
5,770
5,432
5,508
5,507
5,120
4,934
4,686
4,817
4,740
4,260
3,851
3,752
3,362
3,129
3,078
2,969
3,232

(10,557)
(11,106)
(11,214)
(10,857)
(10,438)
( 9,775)
( 8,938)
( 8,651)
( 8,465)
( 8,370)

On register
46.7
48.7
48.4
47.2
45.6
43.2
40.1
39.3
39.2
39.2
39.1
39.6
40.1
40.4
38.3
38.0
41.3
37.9
34.7
34.5
33.9
33.9
35.1
37.2
38.2
39.7
38.l
38.5
36.9
35.5
36.0
33.8
32.7
34.3
35.1
33.5
33.2
32.4
34.4
34.6
31.7
30.0
29.9
27.4
25.9
25.8
25.2
27.7

(41.2)
(43.9)
(44.2)
(43.2)
(41.9)
(39.7)
(36.7)
(36.0)
(35.6)
(35.6)

1941
1940
1939
1938
1937
1936
1935
1934
1933
1932
1931
1930
1929
1928
1927
1926
1925
1924
1923
1922
1921
1920
1919
1918
1917
1916
1915
1914
1913
1912
1911
1910
1909
1908
1907
1906
1905
1904
1903
1902
1901
1900
1899
1898
1897
1896
1895
1894

3,688
3,772
3,803
3,580
3,264
3,098
3,586
4,220
4,587
4,164
3,714
3,187
2,769
2,560
2,480
2,474
2,345
2,225
2,486
2,640
2,150
1,931
1,689
1,468
1,694
2,118
2,064
2,003
1,970 .
1,895
1,865
1,859
1,765
1,476
1,423
1,439
1,367
1,328
1,250
1,214
1,382
1,424
1,445
1,446
1,383
1,361
1,277
1,223

32.1
33.1
33.8
32.1
29.6
28.3
33.1
39.3
43.1
39.6
35.8
31.2
27.6
26.0
25.7
26.2
25.2
24.3
27.6
29.6
24.5
22.6
20.3
18.0
21.0
26.5
25.9
25.4
25.8
25.6
25.9
26.6
26.0
22.3
22.2
23.6
22.8
22.8
22.1
22.1
25.7
26.9
27.6
27.9
27.0
26.8
25.4
24.6
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IV - EXECUTION STATISTICS

Appendix III continued
Daily

Rate per 100,000

Penitentiary
Population

Canadian
Population

On register
Actual Count

1893
1892
1891
1890
1889
1888
1887
1886
1885
1884
1883
1882
1881
1880
Sources:

Daily Population Rate per 100,000
Penitentiary
Population

Canadian
Population

On register

1879
1,200
1,194
24.2
1,110
1,228
25.1
1878
1,108
1877
1,249
25.8
1876
1,069
1,251
26.2
848
1,195
25.3
1875
1,094
23.4
1874
679
1,159
25.1
1873
567
1,200
26.2
1872
605
1,112
24.5
1871
692
1,039
23.2
1870
756
745
1869
1,113
25.1
1,127
25.8
1868
861
972
1867
1,218
28.2
1,213
28.5
Statistics Canada, 1979, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-8 ,
1987-88; Reed, 1983: Z173-174; Al-14; Z-292-304.

28.7
26.9
27.3
26.7
21.4
17.4
14.8
16.1
18.8
20.9
20.9
24.5
28.1
198 -87,

The 1980-88 figures are average daily counts for the fiscal year ending March 31st
of the year named; they are in all respects like the figures in Table I; the 1979a
figures are estimates derived from a census figure reduced by the proportion of
average population to census given in the 1982-83 report for the year 1980 for
which we have both figures (Actual Count: 8465/8627 x 8530 = 8370; On
Register: 9305/9519 x 9431=9219); the 1960-197% figures are a single census
taken on December 31st; the 1906-1959 figures are as of March 31st; 1877-1905
figures are as of June 30th; 1867-1876 figures are as of December 31st. Canadian
population bases for the rates are as of April 1st from 1867-1901 and as of June 1st
from 1902-1987.

Number of
Executions

Per Death
Sentences

.579(19)
1879-80
11
1881-85
.508(59)
30
23
.535(43)
1886-90
1891-95
14
.412(34)
1896-1900
26
.591(44)
1901-05
29
.580(50)
42
1906-10
.656(64)
1911-15
51
.405(126)
1916-20
47
.420(112)
1921-25
49
.538(91)
1926-30
46
.523(88)
1931-35
83
.783(106)
42
.477(88)
1936-40
1941-45
34
.523(65)
1946-50
.544(114)
62
1951-55
41
.554(74)
1956-60
.159(63)
10
Average (excludmg 1956-8)
.539
Source: Zay, 1965:649 (Y61-67); Reed, 1983: Z21.

Per Murder
Char,!feS

Per
Homicides

.180(61)
.216(139)
.198(116)
.135(104)
.234(111)
.206(141)
.204(206)
.166(308)
.162(290)
.166(295)
.190(242)
.359(231)
.205(205)
.198(172)
.232(267)
.198(207)
.053(190)

.058(796)
.108(772)
.062(674)
.054(626)
.085(731)
.056(735)
.019(945)

.203

.071
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V - DEPORTATION AND IMPRISONMENT 1929/1939-1980/1988
Deportation
Year

Number

Prison

Rate per
100,000
Population

Average
Daily
Population
per 100,000
Population

(All institutions)
97.7
109.9
120.9
126.1
119.0
110.8
97.3
101.9
110.5
120.5
114.3

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

1,964
3,963
6,583
7,647
5,138
1,701
675
605
421
439
413

19.6
38.8
63.4
72.8
48.3
15.8
6.2
5.5
3.8
3.9
3.7

1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88

5,107
5,376
5,191
5,197
5,099
3,950
2,467
2,446
2,809

(Adult Institutions)
21.5
92.4
22.4
93.6
21.3
98.9
21.1
109.3
20.6
108.4
15.8
110.0
9.8
111.5
114.0
9.6
11.0
112.7

121.3*
127.8**
1930-34
146.4*
153.1 **
1932
178.7*
186.0**
Average
1980-88
122.7
1984-88
124.7
1983
130.4
The figures with asterisks have been adjusted to make them comparable with figures for
adult institutions only as per footnote 3 in the text
denotes deflator of 99. 7/118. 7
*
**
denotes deflator of .898.
Average

Sources:

1930-39

26.2
26.2
47.8
47 .8
72.8
72.8
17
13.4

Total of
Deportation
and Prison

95.1 *
101.6**
98.6*
105.3**
105.9*
113.2**
105.6
111.3

Roberts, 1988:38; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1940: 160; Employment and
Immigration Canada, Annual Reports 1979/80-1987/8 8.

VI - ADULT PRISON AND PROBATION ADMISSIONS IN
ONTARIO 1965-1988
Annual Admissions
Prison

Probation

(Eate2

Adjusted for YOA Effect
Ratio

Prison

Probation

(Eate2

Ratio

1987-88 66,170 24,168 (261) 2.7:1
72,093 30,266 (326) 2.4:1
1986-87 64,311 23,237 (255) 2.8:1
69,719 29,296 (322) 2.4:1
1985-86 64,466 24,555 (271) 2.6:1
68,166 28,999 (320) 2.4:1
1984-85 67,785 30,053 (336) 2.3:1
1983-84 68,138 28,997 (329)
2.3:1
1982-83 71,090 29,500 (338)
2.4:1
1981-82 65,576 31,665 (367) 2.1:1
1980-81 65,776 31,107 (361)
2.1:1
1979-80 60,701 29,775 (350) 2.0:1
1978-79 61,834 27,822 (329)
2.2:1
1977-78 59,072 21,413 (256)
2.8:1
1976-77 59,362 18,851 (228)
3.1:1
1975-76 54,791 19,323 (235)
2.8:1
1974-75 54,721 17,386 (215)
3.1:1
1973-74 56,072 13,691 (172) 4.1:1
1972-73 56,754 11,225 (143) . 5.1:1
1971-72 65,664 10,270 (133)
6.4:1
1970-71 76,284
1969-70 66,595
1968-69 62,097
1967-68 61,120
1966-67 61,343
1965-66 58,230 6,547
(97)
8.9:1
1964-65 58,431
Sources: Ontario, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985; Statistics
Canada, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1982-1983 through 1987-1988; McFarlane,
1966:89(for1965); Reed, 1983:Z175-197.
All admissions save probation admissions for 1965-1966 are for the fiscal year
ending March 31st. Probation admissions for 1965-66 are for the calendar' year
1965. The Canadian population bases for the rates are as of June 1st of the fiscal
year comprehended by the admissions.
The YOA effect is calculated as in Table I, with "open custody" treated as
'
imprisonment. Had it not been so treated, the differences would again be small,
with the ratios for 1986-1988 each being 2.3:1 instead of 2.4:1.
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VIII - YEARLY ADMISSIONS TO CUSTODIAL AND
SUPERVISED POPULATION - CANADA 1978-1988

VII - AVERAGE DAILY ADULT PRISON AND PROBATION
POPULATION - ONTARIO 1957-1988

1987-88
1986-87
1985-86
1984-85
83-84
82-83
81-82
80-81
79-80
78-79
77-78
76-77
75-76
74-75
73-74
72-73
71-72
70-71
69-70
68-69
67-68
66-67
65-66
64-65
63-64
62-63
61-62
60-61
59-60
58-59
57-58

Probation Ratio
Prison
(Rate)
(Rate)
8,701(94) 34,493(371) 1:4.0
8,610(95) 34,868(383) 1:4.0
8,927(99) 37,771(417) 1:4.2
9,090(102) 37,974(425) 1:4.2
8,741(99) 36,902(419) 1:4.2
8,739(100) 35,666(409) 1:4.1
2,406(376) 1:4.1
7,864(91)
7,334(86) 32,011(374) 1:4.4
7 ,779(92) 29,941(352) 1:3.8
8,236(98) 26,362(312) 1:3.2
8,437(101) 22,631(271) 1:2.7
8,254(100) 19,672(238) 1:2.4
7 ,538(92) 17,838(218) 1:2.4
7,010(87) 15,832(197) 1:2.3
6,899(87) 13,561(171) 1:2.0
6,567(84) 12,044(154) 1:1.8
6,464(84) 11,237(146) 1:1.7
6,669(88)
6,746(91)
6,811(94)
6,812(96)
6,749(97)
6,748(99)
5,225(79) 1.3:1
6,934(105)
7,157(110)
7,205(113)
7,232(116)
7,072(116)
6,791(114)
6,712(115)
6,475(115)

Adjusted for YOA
9809(106)
9575(105)
9372(103)

40853(e)(441)
41,187(453)
39,915(441)

The prison data are a combination of the population of Ontario correctional institutions and federal
penitentiaries located in Ontario. For 1978/9-1987/8 they consist of average daily counts for the
fiscal year ending March 31st; for 1957-1958 to 1969-1970 they are the average of the counts for
March 31 of each year; for 1970-1971 to 1977-1978 they are the average of the counts for March
31st of each year for the provincial prisons only, while for the federal penitentiaries they are the
count for December 31st of the first year mentioned. The probation data are the average daily
counts for 1978-1979 to 1984-1985; for 1970-1971 to 1977-1978 they are the average of the
counts for March 31 of each year; for 1964-65 they are the population under supervision for
January 1, 1965; Rates are per 100,000 Ontario population as of June 1st comprehended by the
fiscal year.
The YOA effect is calculated as in Table I, with open custody assigned to prison and not to
probation. If it were assigned to probation, the ratios for 1986, 1987 and 1988 would be 1:4.3, 4.5
and 4.4 respectively.
Sources:

Provincial
Custody

1:4.2
1:4.3
1:4.3

Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1957-1959, 1960-1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 19641965, 1965-1966, 1966-1967, 1967-1968, 1968-1969, 1969-1970, 1970; Statistics
Canada, 1971a, 1972, 1973a, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1982-1983 through
1987-1988; Ontario, 1985; McFarlane, 1966:89.

1987~88

Probation

Total

196,552 (e)
53,521
250,073
(208,607) (e)
(64,408)
(273,015)
1986-87
190,108
52,749
242,857
(200,973)
(63,954)
(264,927)
1985-86
190,286
54,838
245,124
(197,729)
(63,034)
(260,763)
1984-85
193,602
62,986
257,714
1983-84
199,852
63,567
263,419
1982-83
201,690
65,550
267,240
1981-82
183,450
66,245
249,695
1980-81
170,874
62,875
233,749
1979-80
160,078
58,631
18,709
1978-79
158,428
56,342
214,770
Admissions are "from liberty" not including transfers.

Rate Per
100,000
Canadian
Po ulation
976
(1,065)
960
(1,047)
967
(1,028)
1,026
1,058
1,085
1,026
972
921
913

Custody
as%
of Total
78.6
(76.4)
78.3
(75.9)
77.6
(75.8)
75.2
75.9
75.5
73.5
73.1
73.2
73.8

Figures in brackets are adjusted for YOA, assuming as in Table I that open custody
should be assigned to prison and not to probation. If it were assigned to probation,
the percentage custody for 1986, 1987 and 1988 would be 75.7 per cent, 75.3 per
cent and 75.7 per cent respectively.
Sources: Statistics Canada, 1982-83 through 1987-88, Ontario, 1985.
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IX - AVERAGE DAILY CUSTODIAL AND SUPERVISED
POPULATION - CANADA 1978-1988

1987-88
1986-87
1985-86
1984-85
1983-84
1982-83
1981-82
1980-81
1979-80
1978-79

Average
Daily
Probation
Population
66,405
(76,291)
67,133
(77,078)
72,249
(75,646)
74,707
74,386
71,880
65,123
62,656
59,248
53,937

Parole
and Mandatory
Sup.
11,526

10,887
9,994
10,191
10,042
9,032
9,182
8,131
8,037
7,801

Total
Noncustodial

77,931
(87,817)
78,020
(87,965)
82,243
(85,640)
84,898
84,428
80,912
74,305
. 70,787
67,285
61,738

Custodial
and Noncustodial

26,634
(28,873)
26,893
28,864)
27,392
(28,277)
27,634
26,980
26,924
24,064
22,502
21,936
21,956

~

Total
Custodial

~
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RA TES PER 100,000 CANADIAN POPULATION
Custodial

1987-88
1986-87
1985-86
1984-85
1983-84
1982-83
1981-82
1980-81
1979-80
1978-79

104 (112.7)
106 (114.0)
108 (111.5)
110
108
109
99
94
92
93

NonCustodial
304 (343)
308 (348)
324 (338)
338
339
328
305
294
283
263

Total

408 (455)
415 (462)
432 (449)
448
448
438
404
388
376
356

>tj
"""'"'"'"""""'"""" 1--'"'"""" "'"""""'"""" 1--'
~~~~~~~~~00~00\0\00000\0\001--10~N1--11--10
OO~WN~~NOO~~oo~~~~~N~O~~~~o~~

Non-Custodial
as% of Total
74.5 (75.3)
74.4 (75.3)
75.0 (75.2)
75.4
75.8
75.0
75.5
75.9
75.4
73.8

~
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Figures in brackets are adjusted for YOA effect, assuming as in Table I that open custody should
be assigned to prison and not to probation. If it were assigned to probation, the percentage noncustodial for 1986, 1987 and 1988 would be 75.3 per cent, 75.9 per cent and 76.0 per cent
respectively.
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Sources: Statistics Canada, 1982-1983 through 1987-1988, Ontario, 1985.
Note: The 1987-1988 Statistics Canada report excludes lock-up data for the first time. In the
interests of comparability they have been included in the table nevertheless. This required an
estimate to be made for 1987-1988, based on the Statistics Canada report for 1986-1987
where lockups for 1986-1987 are included and the report for 1987-1988 where lockups for
1986-1987 are not included. It was assumed that the proportion of lock-ups to ordinary
imprisonment was the same for both years. Therefore the 1987-1988 figure of 190,141
without lock-ups was multiplied by 190,108/183,907 to get the total of 196,552. The
same reasoning applies to daily population figures, but the numbers in this case are tiny due
to the short duration of lockup imprisonment, so no attempt has been made to include them
in the tables on population.
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226 I Criminal Justice
*Total Driving includes the offences of criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence
causing bodily harm, criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, driving while
impaired or with more than the allowed alcohol/blood ratio (Criminal Code), failure to remain at
the scene of an accident, dangerous driving, and driving while disqualified (Criminal Code and
provincial statute)
**Driving while impaired or with more than the allowed alcohol/blood ratio and refusal to provide
a breath sample.
***Commencing 1986, changes were made to the Criminal Code, which affect the comparability
of driving offence statistics. Offences were expanded to include boats and aircraft as well as motor
vehicles. In 1986 and 1987 such offences constituted less than one per cent of the total but, the
way statistics are reported makes it impossible to determine the precise numbers. The figures in
the table attempt to exclude offences committed with boats and aircraft Including them would
change the figures to 1589 and 572 for 1987, and 1604 and 587 for 1986. Also, as of 1986 the
offences of impaired operation of a motor vehicle et cetera. causing bodily harm or causing death
were added. Theoretically these should be included in the impaired offences because they would
have constituted such offences before the change. But most certainly some of these offences,
perhaps all of them, would have been prosecuted under other charges (criminal negligence causing
death or bodily harm) before and to include them now would suggest more of an increase or less of
a decrease in the impaired category than has actually occurred. I have therefore excluded them. If
they were included, the figures for 1987 would be 579 (with boats and aircraft) or 577 (without)
and for 1986:594 (with) and 591 (without).
Calculations for 1986: Total driving: 406,635 (1604); without boats: 405,333 (1599); impaired
driving: 150,571 (594); without harm: 148,794 (587); impaired driving without boats: 149,932
(591); impaired driving without boats and without harm: 148,316 (585).
Calculations for 1987: Total driving: 407,087 (1589); without boats: 405,836 (1584); impaired
driving: 148,320 (579); without harm: 146,586 (572); impaired driving without boats: 147,741
(577); impaired driving without boats and without harm: 146,107 (570).

****In 1983 several changes in the Criminal Code came into effect which affect comparability.
For the category of "sexual assault: the offences of "rape" and "indecent assault" were replaced by
three categories of "sexual assault" in 1983; while the figures under "sexual assault" for 1962-1982
include not only rape and indecent assault but also various forms of sexual intercourse with
minors, seduction, as well as the offences of "gross indecency" and "buggery and bestiality", the
figures for 1983 and afterwards are restricted to pure sexual assault. For the category "Aggravated
Assault (Wounding)": Wounding was redefined in 1983 and partially replaced by "aggravated
assault". The figures under "Aggravated Assault (Wounding) for 1962-1982 include all offences
under the former section 228 of the Criminal Code, including discharging a firearm; but the 1983
offence of aggravated assault is somewhat narrower. However, separate statistics are now kept on
discharging firearms and I have included these in the category for 1983 and following to maintain
rough comparability. "Other Assault": this category excludes wounding before 1983 and
aggravated assault after 1982; it includes unlawfully causing bodily harm in all years.
*****In 1969, the offence of driving while intoxicated was repealed and the offences of driving
with a higher than permitted alcohol to blood ratio and of refusing to provide a breath sample were
created. This appears to have lead to an immediate increase in the reported offence rate.
Sources:

Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1962a, 1962b, 1965a, 1965b, 1968a, 1968b and
Statistics Canada, 1971a, 197lc, 1975a, 1980, 1984, 1987a, Juristat Service
Bulletin, Volume 7, No. 4 (September, 1987); for driving offences in 1986 and
1987: unpublished statistics kindly provided to me by the Canadian Centre for
Justice Statistics of Statistics Canada.

